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Abstrak -- Salah satu bagian penting dari kepentingan strategis AS di Asia terletak di kawasan Asia 
Tenggara, yang semakin terancam oleh pengaruh dan dominasi China; sementara cengkeraman 
Cina di wilayah ini menguat, AS tampaknya melonggarkan cengkeramannya. Setidaknya ada dua 
isu utama yang berkontribusi terhadap perubahan ini. Yang pertama adalah ketidakpastian dalam 
persengketaan di Laut Cina Selatan (LCS); tekanan AS pada Tiongkok baik secara diplomatis 
maupun kehadiran militer hanya menunjukkan dampak terbatas, dan kurang meyakinkan bagi 
para pemimpin di Asia Tenggara. Dan yang kedua adalah strategi AS yang tidak jelas untuk 
mengimbangi peningkatan hubungan ekonomi China dengan kawasan ini. Kebijakan AS dalam 
dua masalah ini akan menentukan masa depan hubungan antara AS dan kawasan Asia Tenggara, 
dan secara signifikan mempengaruhi strategi rebalancing AS di Asia, makanya, harus ditangani 
dengan tepat. Studi ini menemukan bahwa AS harus mengadopsi strategi TAMPIL BESAR tetapi 
DAMAI di Laut Cina Selatan, dan menjadi mitra LEBIH BAIK untuk negara-negara Asia Tenggara. 
Inilah strategi kemenangan AS yang lebih mungkin terhadap Asia Tenggara, dan yang akan 
menopang strategi rebalancing AS di Asia Pasifik. 
Kata Kunci: Strategi Kemenangan dan Penyeimbangan, Wilayah Asia Tenggara, Kekuasaan 
dalam Hubungan Internasional 
 
Abstract -- An important part of the U.S.’ broader strategic interests in Asia lays in the Southeast 
Asian region, which is increasingly threatened by China’s growing influence and domination; while 
the China’s grip on the region is strengthening, the U.S seems to be loosening its grip. At least 
there are two central issues that have contributed to the change. The first is an uncertainty in the 
South China Sea (SCS) dispute; the U.S.’ pressures on China both diplomatically and by military 
presence have shown only a limited impact, and have been less convincing to the Southeast Asian 
leaders. And the second is an unclear strategy of the U.S. to balance against the growing 
importance of China’s economic ties with the region. The outcome of these two issues would 
determine the future relations between the U.S. and the Southeast Asian region, and significantly 
affect the U.S. rebalancing strategy in Asia, therefore, should be properly addressed. The study 
                                                 
1 Jonni Mahroza, Ph.D is currently the head of Defense Diplomacy Postgraduate Study Program 
me, at Indonesian Defense University.  
44 | Jurnal Prodi Diplomasi Pertahanan | Desember 2017 | Volume 3 Nomor 3 
found that the U.S. should adopt the strategy of going BIG but PEACEFUL in the South China Sea, 
and being a BETTER partner for the Southeast Asian countries. This seems more possible to be a 
winning strategy towards Southeast Asia, and critical to sustain the U.S.’s rebalancing strategy in 
Asia Pacific.” 
Keywords: Winning and Rebalancing Strategy, Southeast Asia Region, Power in International 
Relations 
 
Introduction - Understand the Context  
he U.S.-Southeast Asian 
relationship is not isolated but 
considerably shaped by 
various international and domestic 
contexts, the interplay of which would be 
determined by the behavior of China, the 
U.S., and the countries of the Southeast 
Asian region. Simply, the relationship is 
happening in the context of China 
emerging as a regional power and 
seeking hegemony; at the same time, U.S. 
global leadership is facing growing 
security challenges, and domestically 
somewhat inward-looking tendencies; 
whereas the Southeast Asian region is 
expecting to balance between keeping 
U.S. security assurance and China’s 
economic support.  
 
International: China, U.S., Southeast Asia 
The World Bank forecasted that China will 
continue to have a high economic growth 
despite consistent declines over years, 
from 6.7% in 2016, to an estimated 6.5% in 
2017, and 6.3% in 2018 and 2019.2 IMF 
World Economic Outlook 2015 estimated 
that China PPP GDP will be more than $23 
trillion, bigger than the U.S. GDP of $19.37 
trillion, and has been the biggest world 
trading country with an amount of $4.2 
trillion in 2014, compared to the U.S. total 
trade which is $3.94 trillion.3 As part of its 
economic development, China is 
launching a mega infrastructure project 
of One Belt One Road (OBOR), which 
would better connect China’s economy 
by sea and land with Europe, Asia, and 
Africa. The South China Sea and the 
Southeast Asian region hold an important 
portion and location of this OBOR 
project. Not only they would serve as its 
major trade routes, but the Southeast 
Asian countries provide a big market for 
Chinese products and important sources 
for raw materials to boost its giant 
economy.  
                                                 
2 “Global Economic Prospects: Weak 
Investment in Uncertain Time”, The World 
Bank, A World Bank Flagship Report 
January 2017, worldbank.org. 
3 “Gross Domestic Product”, IMF World 
Economic Outlook, October 2015. Imf.org. 
T 
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Here lies the strategic importance 
of its military stronghold in the middle of 
the South China Sea to project the 
Chinese military capability to the whole 
region. Therefore, despite a rejection by 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
in July 2016 to its claim over the South 
China Sea, China has continued to build 
massive infrastructure for its military 
bases in the islands. China has ignored 
repeated calls by the U.S. and 
international community to abide with 
internal norms and rules. When the U.S. 
began to conduct the Freedom of 
Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to 
protect its interests in the region, China 
reacted strongly and warned that the 
FONOPs are a violation against its 
sovereignty. 
On the other hand, the U.S. 
continued low economic growth, from 
2.4% in 2014 to an estimated 1.9% in 2019,4 
a growing global security challenges 
stretching from Eastern Europe to Middle 
East and North Africa to Asia could 
overstretch the U.S. strategic capability. 
In Europe, Russia has posed an increasing 
challenge, as in the case of Ukraine, 
annexation of Crimea, growing threats to 
                                                 
4 This is despite a slightly better economic 
growth than other world’s industrial states, 
Ibid. 
Baltic states. Recently Russia expanded 
its involvement in Syria by protecting 
President Bashar Al-Assad and fighting 
against rebel groups that the U.S. has 
been supporting. Continued U.S. 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
unclear future of Syria and nuclear Iran, 
along with Israel-Palestinian difficult 
peace process and Yemen crisis, all 
require serious attentions. The U.S. is still 
and may continue to be the biggest and 
strongest military power in the next 
decade or two, but the growing geo-
political strategic challenges, as well as 
the U.S. global war on terror could 
compromise the effectiveness of the U.S. 
to respond simultaneously. 
In Asia, the U.S. rebalancing 
strategy toward China has been inevitably 
marked by security confrontation and 
economic cooperation. For the U.S., the 
military confrontation has seemed to be 
mainly interpreted by the growing 
military presence to ensure the issues of 
Korean peninsula, Taiwan and the South 
China Sea properly controlled.5 Whereas 
for China, it responds by what it called as 
“New Great Game”, by strengthening its 
nuclear arsenal and military bases in the 
                                                 
5 “Barack Obama Says Asia-Pacific Is ‘Top US 
Priority’”, BBC News, November 17, 2011, 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
15715446 
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South China Sea, that would also protect 
its sovereignty over Taiwan, and other 
important interests in the region.6 In the 
issue of North Korea’s nuclear programs, 
the U.S. relies heavily on China, North 
Korean’s only ally, to find a diplomatic 
solution7; this could potentially 
compromise the U.S. military opposition 
to Chinese assertiveness in the South 
China Sea. Meanwhile, the economic 
cooperation has been imperative with the 
vast expansion of U.S.-China economic 
interdependence, especially as the 
biggest trade partners for one another. 
The U.S. Census Bureau noted that in 
2016, U.S. total exports to China were 
$116 billion, while total imports were $463 
billion.8 The fact that China is holding a 
significant amount of U.S. debt, $1.059 
trillion as of February 2017, equal to 27.8 
percent of the $3.8 trillion in treasury 
bills, notes, and bonds held by foreign 
                                                 
6 Yang Razali Kassim, “The New Great Game: 
ASEAN’s Balancing Act?” RSIS 
Commentaries, 
 January 17, 2012, at 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspe
ctive/ RSIS0142012.pdf  
7 During the recent visit by the Chinese 
President Xi Jianping to the U.S., President 
Donald Trump urged China to play a greater 
role to stop the North Korean nuclear test. 
“Calls for calm as US dispatches naval 
might to Korean waters”, CNN, Alert News 
Alert, Politics, April, 12, 2017, cnn.org 
8 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade, 2016 
Trade in Goods with China, census.gov 
countries;9 and on the other hand, China’s 
economic growth depends greatly on the 
regional stability; this means, it needs 
reasonably stable relations.  
Most Southeast Asian countries 
seem to be trapped in the need to keep 
both the U.S. security assurance and 
China’s economic support. None of them 
see themselves as strong enough to 
challenge Chinese militarily, therefore 
they rely heavily on the U.S. presence in 
the region to balance China’s growing 
military. Meanwhile, all countries in the 
region have seen their economic relations 
with China a vital interest. The China–
ASEAN Free Trade Area was signed on 4 
November 2002 in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, and came into effect on 1 
January 2010. The ASEAN–China Free 
Trade Area is the largest free trade area in 
terms of population and third largest in 
terms of nominal GDP.10 And China, 
                                                 
9 Kimberly Amadeo, “U.S. Debt to China: How 
Much Does It Own? Exactly How Much U.S. 
Debt Does China Own? And Why?,” The 
Balance, April 17, 2017, 
https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-debt-to-
china-how-much-does-it-own-3306355  
10 Andrew Walker, “China and Asean free 
trade deal begins”, BBC News January 1, 
2010; Liz Gooch, “Asia Free Trade Zone 
Raises Hopes, and Some Fears About 
China”, The New York Times, December 31, 
2009. 
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followed by Japan and the U.S., is the 
largest trading partner of ASEAN.11    
However, U.S. security protection 
seems to be uncertain; the U.S.’ repeated 
call for China to comply with the 
international norms and rules, combined 
with FONOPs in the SCS have not 
deterred China. China has kept 
strengthening its military capability in the 
SCS, and denying the rights of other 
claimants. One of important obstacles is 
that the U.S. has refused to ratify the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which China then cites as a 
reason to ignore U.S. protests.  
The region’s common interest is the 
U.S. playing an effective, but constructive 
role, meaning that they want to see more 
U.S. actions, but without resorting to a 
dangerous conflict. For example, in 2016 
the Jakarta Post wrote that Indonesian 
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, 
Arrmanatha Nasir said that, “maintaining 
stability in the South China Sea is a shared 
responsibility between China, ASEAN, and 
other countries related to the water,” 
and in a joint statement by Cambodia, 
Laos and Brunei that, “countries outside 
                                                 
11 ASEAN Merchandise Trade Statistics 
Database, 
http://asean.org/storage/2015/12/table20_as
-of-10-June-2016.pdf, accessed April 27, 
2017. 
the region [including the U.S.] should play 
a constructive role…”12 This is actually 
convergent with the U.S. and China’s 
interests, to avoid a nuclear war and to 
secure economic cooperation, but has yet 
to be properly interpreted into a strategy. 
  
Domestic Context: U.S. and Southeast 
Asian Nations 
The U.S. foreign policies under President 
Donald Trump has taken a very different 
direction, partly marked by the U.S. 
withdrawal from various multilateral 
arrangements. It has canceled the TPP 
(Trans Pacific Partnerships) trade 
agreement, begun evaluating other 
agreements such as North Atlantic Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
threatened to reduce its contribution to 
the United Nations. U.S. security allies, 
such as NATO, Japan, south Korea have 
increasingly questioned the future of U.S. 
commitment to their respective alliance. 
The U.S. administration has shown more 
interested in bilateral approaches by 
prioritizing U.S. national interests, with an 
“America First” slogan. Trump’s 
administration is prioritizing more efforts 
to fulfil Trump’s campaign promises in 
domestic issues, such as repeal and 
                                                 
12 Anggi M Lubis, “RI Wants China-ASEAN 
Talks”, Jakarta Post, April 26, 2016.    
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replace Obamacare, immigration 
regulations, including a controversial U.S.-
Mexico border wall, which all seem to be 
difficult. Current military operations in 
Syria and more military posturing on the 
Korean peninsula have given no clear 
signs, whether as a change in priority, or 
as a temporary escape from growing 
frustrations over domestic politics. 
Especially with North Korea, the U.S. 
needs more cooperation from China, and 
could consequently soften U.S. pressure 
on China over the SCS issues. 
Similar self-interested tendencies 
are also found in the Southeast Asian 
region. For example, current Indonesian 
President Joko Widodo, is less interested 
in playing a leading or brokering role to 
find a broader solution for the SCS 
dispute, and more focused on its national 
interest in securing Indonesia’s portion of 
disputed area located in the northern part 
of Natuna islands. Jokowi has been the 
leader of ASEAN, President Rodridgo 
Duterte of the Philippines too, is less 
interested in having military alliance with 
the U.S. in favor of securing economic 
relations with China. He has abandoned 
the PCA ruling. The leaderships in 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei are 
disappointed with the U.S. government’s 
decision to cancel the TPP, and are 
uncertain about the future engagements 
with the U.S. While Singapore, Thailand, 
Burma. Laos and Cambodia, which are not 
claimants, are concerned more about 
regional instability caused by major 
power competitions, thus, tend to choose 
passive positions on the SCS issues.  
The importance of the Southeast 
Asian region to the U.S. rebalancing 
strategy in Asia is debatable. Unlike 
during the Cold-War period on which the 
U.S. had supported its containment policy 
by helping to establish the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), today 
ASEAN is much different. The 
membership has grown from original 5 in 
1967 to 10 members since 1998 that 
include all countries in the Southeast 
Asian region. And although ASEAN has 
achieved a wide range of intra-ASEAN and 
extra-ASEAN cooperation, it remains a 
loose regional cooperative amongst 
countries with different national 
interests, political system, and levels of 
development. Unlike Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Indonesia that are claimants, non-
claimant countries, especially Cambodia 
and Laos, refuse to use ASEAN as a 
vehicle to approach the South China Sea 
dispute. ASEAN’s passive position 
provides little, if no help for advancing 
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the U.S. interests. Therefore, like previous 
Obama administration, there has not 
been any significant sign of the new 
administration’s interest in advancing 
cooperation with ASEAN.  
However, without better 
cooperation with the region, the U.S. 
rebalancing strategy in Asia will become 
less effective. During the Obama 
administration, diplomatic pressure on 
China by using international norms and 
rules was weakened by the fact that the 
U.S. has not ratified the UNCLOS. Its 
multilateral approach, such as by 
initiating TPP, failed after being cancelled 
by the Trump administration. The Trump 
administration’s military approach has 
seemed to rely only on the FONOPs, 
which has not been effective, and less 
interested in stressing the international 
legal norms and values. A more holistic 
solution to the SCS dispute and a stronger 
engagement with the region will 
effectively sustain a broader rebalancing 
strategy toward Asia. The status-quo, 
meaning ineffective FONOPs, weak 
diplomatic pressures on China, a divided 
Southeast Asian, and a lack of U.S. 
engagement with the region, will 
continue to benefit China. To benefit the 
U.S., all of these must be reversed in the 
next U.S. strategy.  
Assumptions 
China is likely to continue the 
development of military base and 
infrastructure projects in the South China 
Sea. It will likely to utilize this to enforce 
its maritime territory by implementing 
Access Denial (AD) in a new Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) within the nine 
dashed line. U.S. FONOPs are not likely to 
reverse the Chinese development of 
military infrastructure in the disputed 
area. A maximum result that the U.S. is 
likely to achieve peacefully is to deny 
China’s claim over maritime territory by 
using its man-made islands as ruled by 
UNCLOS, but let China keeping the 
existing infrastructures on these islands. 
This would secure the U.S. demand for 
the Freedom of Navigation, and deter the 
Chinese from launching military 
operations against other claimants from 
the islands. Although China is more likely 
to insist on bilateral dialogues with all 
claimants, to give its more time building 
stronger military capability in the 
disputed region, FONOPs will help 
prevent China from forcing other 
claimants to accept its unilateral claim. 
This will likely to be more effective if the 
U.S. Senate ratifies UNCLOS and 
mobilizes international diplomatic 
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pressures on China to uphold the PCA 
ruling.  
Whereas, direct military 
engagements with certain countries, 
similar to previous arrangements with the 
Philippines, will be likely to divide the 
region more deeply, and encourage 
resistant from other countries, like 
Cambodia, Laos, or Burma. This division 
will likely to benefit China. The U.S. is 
strong enough to conduct FONOPs 
unilaterally, or joint patrols with other 
external powers, such as Japan or 
Australia, will be beneficial. These 
FONOPs will work under the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent, that China will not likely to 
take risk a nuclear war with the U.S. 
should FONOPs develop into a limited 
military conflict.          
Meanwhile, China’s economic 
relations with Southeast Asian countries 
is likely to deepen, thus, help achieving 
China’s long term influence and 
domination in the region.  However, the 
countries in the region are likely to 
welcome U.S. greater engagement too. 
Especially as China’s economic slowdown 
hurts also their economies, they will likely 
to keep diversifying their trade partners 
and sources of investments, instead of 
relying too much on China; the U.S. just 
needs to engage more. 
Interests  
The U.S. has a vital interest in the 
Freedom of Navigation in the South China 
Sea, not only because it is the main trade 
route of the U.S., its allies and friends, but 
also crucial to the effectiveness of U.S. 
presence in the Asian Pacific region. 
Therefore, it is one of the core 
components of the U.S. rebalancing 
strategy in Asia. Meanwhile, the U.S. has 
an important interest to strengthen its 
relations with Southeast Asian countries 
for a long term, a broader objective of 
maintaining U.S. influence in the region, 
and balancing against China’s growing 
domination. The region’s population of 
more than 620 million combined provide 
a big market which should not be 
dominated by China, and their rich natural 
resources are useful for the U.S. 
economy. Consequently, the U.S. also has 
an important interest in the promoting 
free market economies, democracy, and 
human rights, to ensure that American 
values are protected and projected in the 
region. 
 
Threats/Opportunities  
The U.S. interest in the Freedom of 
Navigation in the South China Sea is 
threatened by China’s claim and military 
buildup in the disputed SCS area. It is 
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building military base and infrastructures 
in the area from where it is enforcing 
Access Denial (AD), and may declare an 
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). If 
fully implemented in this ADIZ, U.S. ships 
and aircrafts will no longer have free 
access to this main trade route. The U.S. 
could just ignore it as it did in East and 
Southeast Asia, but when China’s military 
has become more powerful, the potential 
for incidents from ignoring it will become 
more dangerous. In December 2016 the 
Chinese Navy captured a U.S. underwater 
drone, demonstrating that it has the 
capability to impose law enforcement in 
the area,13 and in February 10, 2017 the 
Diplomat reported that the Chinese 
surveillance aircraft flew in unsafe 
distance to U.S. surveillance aircrafts.14 
Furthermore, because of strategic 
location in the middle of the SCS that 
China is claiming, the U.S. protection for 
its allies and friends in the region, such as 
                                                 
13 “Chinese warship seizes US underwater 
drone in international waters”, The 
Guardian, December 16, 2016, 
theguardian.com  
14 “US, Chinese Military Aircraft See Close 
Encounter Over South China Sea”, The 
Diplomat, February 10, 2017, 
http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/us-chinese-
military-aircraft-see-close-encounter-over-
south-china-sea/ 
Taiwan and the Philippines will be greatly 
compromised.15 
China’s growing economic 
cooperation with the region also 
challenges U.S. influence and leverage. 
China is offering investments and funding 
for the development of mega-
infrastructure projects in Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Malaysia, providing low 
interest rate loans for Cambodia and 
Laos, building a high speed rail from Laos 
to China, and offering other economic 
support in line with its OBOR project. This 
demonstrates China’s commitment.  
The U.S. has various opportunities 
to pursue a better strategy towards 
Southeast Asia. China’s claim in the SCS 
dispute has been rejected by the PCA in 
July 2016. This rejection provided an 
opportunity to impose stronger 
diplomatic pressures on China and justify 
its FONOPs in the disputed area. The U.S. 
government proposed to ratify UNCLOS, 
and there may be possibility in the future 
that the discussion be re-opened to 
restart the process of ratification. But 
even without ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. 
                                                 
15 Several incidents have happened between 
the Chinese coastguards and the 
Philippines navy, “Armed Clash in the South 
China Sea”, Council on Foreign Relations, 
Contingency Plan Memorandum No. 14, 
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-
clash-south-china-sea/p27883   
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has an opportunity to use other allied 
countries like Japan and NATO countries 
that have ratified UNLOS to mobilize 
international pressures on China. In 
addition, the U.S. has traditional strong 
relations with the Southeast Asian region, 
and through ASEAN Community 
programs, the U.S. can engage more 
intensively with ASEAN in security, 
economic and value projection. The U.S. 
however will need to determine which 
fields of cooperation that suit the U.S. 
objectives, either economically or in 
security.  
 
Goals/ Objectives 
The main objective of the U.S. strategy 
toward the Southeast Asian region is to 
ensure the U.S. interest in Freedom of 
Navigation in the SCS, to deny China from 
using its man-made islands as a legal 
argument to enforce its maritime 
territorial claim over the SCS, and to deter 
China from using its military bases in the 
islands to threaten other countries in the 
region. Another objective of the U.S. 
strategy is to prevent the region from 
being dominated by China economically 
and politically, so that the U.S. 
rebalancing strategy to protect its wider 
interest in Asia in the long term.  
The U.S., however, has two 
negative objectives to prevent a 
dangerous U.S.-China military conflict 
from happening in the region, and to 
prevent negative effects of the strategy 
to the U.S.-China economic relations. This 
major military conflict will be 
disadvantageous to the U.S., China, and 
the whole region. Therefore, FNOPs must 
be aimed mainly as deterrent and backup 
for diplomatic pressures, in order to 
persuade China to agree with the PCA 
ruling.     
 
Ways & Means  
“Theory of Victory” 
More effective FONOPs by U.S. military, 
supported by its major allies, and 
stronger U.S.-led international diplomatic 
pressures on China, as well as a greater 
U.S. engagement with Southeast Asian 
countries, will protect the international 
freedom of navigation in the SCS and 
persuade China to comply with 
international norms and rules, thus to 
compromise its unlawful territorial claims 
over the SCS, as well as to ensure the U.S. 
strong influence in the region. This 
strategy will be pivotal to sustain the U.S. 
rebalancing strategy in Asia Pacific.  
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OIP 1 - Ensure the U.S. Freedom of 
Navigation in the South China Sea by 
conducting a more intensive FONOPs, 
supported by diplomatic and economic 
instruments.   
Although the U.S. is mainly interested in 
freedom of navigation, achieving this 
objective can potentially lead to a 
broader solution to the SCS dispute. 
FONOPs should aim at a maximum level 
to delegitimize the Chinese maritime 
territorial claim in the South China Sea. 
This will have a secondary effect on 
excessive claims by Vietnam or the 
Philippines, which are also beyond the 
UNCLOS guidelines. Although undoing 
Chinese infrastructure in the South China 
Sea islands is unrealistic, the U.S. must 
stop China from using the artificial islands 
as a legal argument to claim territorial 
water, or from using them as the military 
bases to threaten other countries.  
The U.S. should also encourage its 
major allies, such as NATO, Japan, or 
Australia to conduct unilaterally or joint 
FONOPs in the SCS. However, the U.S. 
should not involve ASEAN member 
countries in FONOPs, even the claimants. 
The U.S. only need to ensure that there is 
no resistance from them against FNOPs, 
as well as to gain supports for PCA ruling. 
Let them continue with internal dialogues 
among claimants, which however will 
unlikely to work. The U.S. should go big 
with FNOPs, act as a super power, send a 
clear message to China that if it uses the 
military bases in its artificial islands to 
threaten other countries, the U.S. will 
destroy them as legitimate military 
targets in a matter of hours or less. That 
is how FONOPs as deterrent will work, 
and it will work under a bigger U.S. 
nuclear deterrent.    
In economic cooperation, the U.S. 
can also encourage joint explorations of 
natural resources with the Southeast 
Asian countries in the disputed areas. 
Besides being beneficial economically, 
these joint explorations will also support 
the objective of undermining China’s 
unilateral claim and treating the disputed 
area as international water, except the 
area within which is ruled by UNCLOS.  
Along with FONOPs, the U.S. should 
also mobilize stronger international call 
for China to abide with international 
norms and rules. For this call to be 
effective, the U.S. should, however ratify 
UNCLOS. Ratification will give the U.S. 
more credibility and gain more supports 
from the international community. While 
waiting for the U.S. Senates to ratify 
UNCLOS, the U.S. should mobilize its 
major allies and friends such as EU/ NATO 
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countries, Japan, India, or Australia, most 
of which have ratified UNCLOS persuade 
China. China’s lawless claim must be 
degraded worldwide; any narrative from 
China about territorial sovereignty must 
be immediately rejected because legally 
the SCS is not its territorial water, but an 
international water.   
 
OIP 2 – Strengthen the U.S. influence in 
Southeast Asia by increasing the U.S. 
engagements with Southeast Asian 
countries using military, economic and 
diplomatic means.  
U.S. influence and domination in the 
region cannot be achieved by the U.S. 
retreating from the region, such as with 
the withdrawal from the TPP. Nor can the 
U.S. expect the approaches or initiatives 
coming from the region, simply because 
the countries in the region will not want 
to upset China that offers economic 
supports. Therefore, like China’s 
proactive economic approaches to the 
region, the initiatives should come from 
the U.S., to persuade the region by using 
the resources (military, economics, 
diplomatic, or information) that the U.S. 
has.  
With regard to the approach, the 
U.S. should focus more on multilateral 
than bilateral course of actions to achieve 
a long term effect. As domestic context 
shows, it may be argued that, this will be 
unlikely under Trump. However, 
President Trump complains about 
multilateral free trade agreements 
because they are thought as unfair; other 
countries unfairly take advantages from 
tax and tariff reductions. This strategy 
does not advocate any free trade 
agreement, but is designed for other 
purposes.  
One of the purposes is to 
strengthen U.S. influence in the region by 
establishing strong connections with the 
whole ASEAN members in regional 
security issues, for example, through U.S.-
ASEAN joint exercises, sharing best 
practices, and assisting ASEAN capacity 
building in counter terrorism, maritime 
security, peacekeeping forces, and 
transnational crime prevention. Limited 
joint exercises and operations among 
them, such as joint maritime operations 
between Indonesia and the Philippines in 
the Sulu Sea, have existed; however, they 
have not been effective, due to limited 
capacities in technology and resources. 
The U.S. should use this opportunity to 
intensify such cooperation by offering 
possible assistances. Although the 
approach should be more to ASEAN as a 
whole, bilateral approaches can also be 
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taken as complementary efforts. But too 
much on bilateral approaches may divide 
the region, and to encourage other 
countries like Burma, Laos, and 
Cambodia, to disturb the U.S,’ objective 
of having a full regional influence, just like 
what China has always wanted. 
Therefore, when choosing the programs 
or activities of engagement, the U.S. 
should choose common issues, and avoid 
conflicting issues, such as South China 
Sea disputes.  
In order to get economic benefits 
from its security cooperation, the U.S. can 
persuade ASEAN to establish 
interoperability in SOPs and equipment to 
be purchased from U.S. producers. To 
justify the needs for interoperability, the 
U.S. can persuade ASEAN to establish a 
multilateral standing force for non-
military operations such as ASEAN 
Peacekeeping Force or Joint Maritime 
Task Forces. These kinds of task forces 
have been an ongoing discussion among 
ASEAN member countries, as part of their 
programs to realize Asean Political and 
Security Community; the U.S. just need to 
give them more support.  
Economically, it is to disturb China’s 
market in ASEAN member countries. This 
will be done by investing in the region to 
establish manufactures that would 
produce similar products imported from 
China, but with better quality and lower 
prices. Better quality is possible because 
of U.S. better technologies; while lower 
prices because of locally-produced with 
cheaper labors. The production should be 
scalable by taking advantage of AFTA 
(Asean Free Trade Area). This is not a 
U.S.-AFTA, but the U.S. should make use 
of AFTA. Since the products are not for 
U.S. consumptions, they will not influence 
the U.S. trade balance, while the U.S. 
harvesting revenues from doing business 
overseas as new business models, as well 
as helping ASEAN’s economy, thus 
strengthening the influence. Unlike 
China’s investments, which are mainly in 
energy sectors to exploit their natural 
resources, and in infrastructures which 
are long term investments, U.S. 
investments should be different, focus 
more on manufactures to compete 
against imported products from China. 
The U.S. should promote and 
protect free market economies, 
democracy, and human rights in the 
region. ASEAN member countries have 
various political cultures, from a 
democratic consolidation in Indonesia 
and the Philippines, semi-democracies in 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, 
democratic transitions in Burma and 
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Cambodia, and Monarchy in Brunei 
Darussalam, to Communist in Vietnam 
and Laos, however, all countries support 
free market economies, including 
Vietnam and Laos. Human rights is a 
sensitive issue; therefore, it should come 
along with economic engagement. 
China’s engagements in the region does 
not care about values, the U.S.’ should 
and could bring positive changes. 
Continued supports for NGOs for 
democracy projects and good 
governance in the region will help 
strengthen the U.S. influence at the 
grassroots level, and allow more peaceful 
but more sustainable changes in a 
positive direction.   
 
OIP 3 - Prevent a dangerous major power 
conflict from happening in the region 
through by military and diplomatic 
means.  
The U.S. must ensure that FNOPs aimed 
at denying China from using its artificial 
islands for illegally claiming the 
international water as its maritime 
territory, deterring it from using the 
military bases in the islands to threaten 
other countries using the international 
water. Therefore, in doing so, FNOPs 
should not be allowed to develop into 
dangerous military conflicts, especially 
nuclear war. Therefore, diplomatic 
channels and senior leader engagements 
between U.S. and China should be 
effectively used to communicate each 
other’s positions. However, the strategy 
of deterrent should not be constrained by 
the U.S. fears of China’s retaliation. On 
the contrary, it should be based on the 
China’s fear of a more dangerous war. 
This can only be achieved when the U.S. 
still has obvious military superiority. 
Therefore, timing and scale will be key to 
the U.S. deterrent strategy in the SCS; so, 
go big before it becoming too late.  
The same efforts should also be 
made to protect the U.S.-China economic 
relations, including by avoiding any type 
of economic sanction because it will hurt 
also the U.S. economy. Similarly, the U.S. 
should not fear too much, that China will 
initiate an economic war against the U.S., 
because China needs the U.S. good 
economy and vice versa.    
 
Costs/Risks/ -Ilities Test. 
The cost for conducting FONOPs, 
diplomatic pressures against China, and 
intensified engagements with ASEAN will 
be reasonably low and very affordable, 
although more effective FONOP will need 
more money and resources (ships).  
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The risk to strategy is likely to come 
from the Senate if it is to involve the 
ratification of UNCLOS. But this risk 
would be partial, because it is only an 
additional force to the strategy. Another 
risk to strategy is also likely to come from 
an escalation in the North Korean issue, 
that China might use its role that the U.S. 
expects it to play as a leverage to soften 
the U.S. pressure over the SCS issue. 
However, the U.S. should be consistent 
with its positions in both issues. China 
wants stability in the Korean peninsula 
just as much as the U.S. and its allies do. 
President Trump’s position in the North 
Korean nuclear program is clear, if China 
does not play its role properly, the U.S. 
will go alone. This should be the same 
with the SCS.          
The greatest risk from the strategy 
is the failure of deterrent because of 
undetected cause of accidents 
encountered at sea during the FONOPs. 
This can be mitigated by better operation 
planning, and communication with all 
parties involved in the operations. The 
highest risk that the U.S should accept is 
a minimum cost of a quick, and limited 
military operation to destroy China’s 
military bases in the artificial islands. 
Nuclear deterrent must be ensured to 
stop it from escalating further. 
Feasibility (high) – FONOPs have 
been an ongoing operation and 
intensifying them is highly feasible. 
Similarly, increasing U.S. engagement 
with Southeast Asian countries is highly 
feasible as U.S. generally has good 
relations with all countries in the region, 
with some of them are traditional allies 
(Thailand and the Philippines), or 
Singapore and Vietnam, with which the 
U.S. relations are getting stronger.  
Desirability (high) – The strategy will 
be highly desirable to serve the higher 
level of U.S. national interest in the region 
and in Asia.  
Suitability (high) – The strategy will 
suit both U.S. government and 
governments in the Southeast Asian 
region because the engagements will be 
based on mutual benefits for the 
interests of all parties. 
Acceptability (high) – Domestically 
as well as internationally, U.S. strategy 
toward Southeast Asian countries will be 
highly acceptable because of low cost 
both financially and morally. 
Sustainability (high) – The strategy 
is highly sustainable because FONOPs has 
international and domestic support. 
Similarly, U.S. increased economic 
engagements with the Southeast Asian 
region will be welcome. 
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Conclusion 
Strategic Leaderships Challenges 
One of the most important challenges for 
the U.S. strategic leaderships would be to 
convince U.S. domestic public and 
stakeholders about the importance of the 
U.S. ratifying UNCLOS. Not only that this 
ratification will give the U.S. the strongest 
position in the SCS dispute, but also the 
biggest gains, because all the claimants 
that are UNCLOS non-complying will lost 
their claims. For a long-term goal, this 
ratification will help restore the U.S. 
global leaderships based on international 
rules and norms. Another challenge for 
the U.S. leaderships is how to convince 
the current administration about the 
importance of long term relations with 
the Southeast Asian region. The relations 
which might be difficult to understand for 
short-term-minded politicians. Therefore, 
the U.S. leadership will need to 
communicate with them to give this long 
term policy perspective.  
As suggested by domestic contexts, 
both of these challenges seem difficult to 
overcome with the current U.S. 
administration, especially with its cynical 
toward international norms and rules, 
and multilateral approaches.  Therefore, 
strategists at all spheres of the national 
security should speak up to warn the U.S. 
leadership even louder. A good strategy 
should not merely serve to satisfy a 
domestic popularity of the current 
leaderships, but should be based on a 
holistic, deliberate thinking. In addition, 
the first priority for the U.S. strategy 
towards Southeast Asia is to resolve the 
SCS problem, and going BIG seems to be 
compatible with the current 
administration. Whereas a broader 
relation with the countries in the region is 
a long term objective; if the current 
administration is not interested, the next 
administration perhaps may be interested 
in pursuing it.    
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